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This dissertation uses a regional approach to assess the
aggregate effects of cutting taxes on corporations and on taxpayers in different income groups. Determining the optimal
course for economic policy critically depends on the efficiency and equity consequences of these policies.
The first chapter estimates the incidence of state corporate taxes on workers, landowners, and firm owners in a
spatial equilibrium model in which corporate taxes affect the
location choices of both firms and workers. Heterogeneous,
location-specific productivities and preferences determine
the mobility of firms and workers, respectively. Owners
of monopolistically competitive firms receive economic
profits and may bear the incidence of corporate taxes, as
heterogeneous productivity can make them inframarginal
in their location choices. We derive a simple expression
for equilibrium incidence as a function of a few estimable
parameters. Using variation in state corporate tax rates and
apportionment rules, we estimate the reduced-form effects
of tax changes on firm and worker location decisions, wages,
and rental costs. We then use minimum distance methods to
recover the parameters that determine equilibrium incidence
as a function of these reduced-form effects. In contrast to
previous assumptions of infinitely mobile firms and perfectly
immobile workers, we find that firms are only approximately
twice as mobile as workers over a 10-year period. This fact,
along with equilibrium impacts on the housing market,
implies that firm owners bear roughly 40 percent of the incidence, while workers and land owners bear 35 percent and
25 percent, respectively. Finally, we derive revenue-maximizing state corporate tax rates and discuss interactions with
other local taxes and apportionment formulae.
The second chapter investigates how tax changes for
different income groups affect macroeconomic activity.
Using historical tax returns from the National Bureau of Economic Research’s TAXSIM, I construct a measure of who
received (or paid for) Romer and Romer (2012) exogenous
tax changes. I aggregate these tax changes by income group
and state. Variation in the income distribution across U.S.
states and federal tax changes generates variation in regional
tax shocks that I exploit to test for heterogeneous effects. I
find that the negative relationship between tax changes and
growth is largely driven by tax changes for lower-income
groups, and that the effect of tax cuts for the top 10 percent
on employment growth is small.
The dissertation evaluates the following questions: What
are the aggregate effects on economic activity of cutting
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taxes on corporations, and what are the aggregate effects
on taxpayers in different income groups? A fundamental
problem in answering these questions, however, is a dearth
of data. Some economists have looked to the past to help
understand the effects of these policies, but extrapolating
from infrequent tax changes is difficult since there simply are
not that many data points from U.S. macroeconomic history.
As such, many resort to cross country analysis and highly
structured models, but both approaches have significant limitations; countries are different in many unobservable ways
and structured models often produce answers that ultimately
reflect assumptions rather than the data itself.
Recognizing these limitations, economists have increasingly been using regions within the United States as labs
of democracy to determine the effects of fiscal policies.
Looking at the economic performance of states or cities is
not only interesting and important in its own right, but it also
provides much more data and enables economists to focus
on places that got different doses of economic medicine and
to learn about the medicine’s effects. This regional analysis
about different types of economic medicine, whether it is
lower corporate taxes, reduced government spending, or
upper-income tax cuts, can help sort through competing theories and provide valuable insight for policymakers who are
considering different policy prescriptions.
In what follows, I introduce the two parts of my dissertation. The first evaluates the welfare effects of cutting
corporate income taxes on business owners, workers, and
landowners; the second analyzes the effects of tax cuts for
different income groups on output and employment growth.

Chapter 1
Who Benefits from State Corporate
Tax Cuts? A Local Labor Markets Approach
with Heterogeneous Firms
(with Juan Carlos Suárez Serrato)
Policymakers often use local economic development policies, such as corporate tax policy, to encourage businesses
to locate in their jurisdictions (Story 2012). For instance, the
governors of Kansas, Nebraska, and Louisiana have recently
advocated for large state corporate income tax cuts Stevenson (2013). This chapter evaluates the welfare effects of
cutting corporate income taxes on business owners, workers,
and landowners. We make three contributions: 1) new empirical evidence of the effects of tax cuts on business location,
2) a new framework for evaluating the welfare effects of
corporate tax cuts, and 3) a new assessment of corporate tax
incidence and efficiency that is useful for policymakers.
In the standard open economy model of corporate tax
incidence, immobile workers bear the full incidence of
corporate taxes as capital flees high-tax locations (Kotlikoff
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and Summers 1987; Gordon and Hines 2002). As a result, the
conventional wisdom among economists and policymakers
is that corporate taxation in an open economy is unattractive
on both efficiency and equity grounds; it distorts the location
and scale of economic activity and falls on the shoulders of
workers. The standard model, however, neither incorporates
the location decisions of firms, which increasingly drive
policymakers’ decisions on corporate tax policy, nor the possibility that a firm’s productivity can differ across locations.
This chapter enhances the standard model by allowing
the location decisions of monopolistically competitive and
heterogeneously productive firms to determine the level
and spatial distribution of capital, employment, and production. Accounting for these realistic features has substantial
implications for the incidence and efficiency of corporate
taxation. If a firm is especially productive in a given location,
it can be inframarginal in its location choice. That is, tax and
factor price increases may not offset productivity advantages enough to make relocation profitable. For example,
if California were to increase corporate tax rates modestly,
both new and existing technology firms may still find Silicon Valley the most profitable place in the world for them
to locate. Thus, if firms’ productivities are heterogeneous
across locations, the location decisions of firms will be less
responsive to corporate tax changes, and firm owners will
bear some of the burden of corporate taxes. Furthermore, this
lower responsiveness decreases the efficiency cost of raising
revenue through corporate income taxation. Assessing the
equity and efficiency of state corporate income taxes requires
quantifying the extent to which location-specific productivity
limits firm mobility.
Our analysis proceeds in three steps. We first present
reduced-form evidence on the effects of taxes on business
location. We then develop a model of spatial equilibrium
with firm location to interpret these effects and characterize
the welfare impacts on business owners, workers, and landowners. Finally, we estimate the parameters that govern this
model and quantify these welfare effects. The variation in
our empirical analysis comes from changes to state corporate
tax rates and apportionment rules, which are state-specific
rules that govern how national profits of multistate firms
are allocated for tax purposes. We implement these state
corporate tax system rules using matched firm-establishment
data and construct a measure of the average tax rate that
businesses pay in a local area. This approach not only closely
approximates actual taxes paid by businesses, but it also provides multiple sources of identifying variation from changes
in state tax rates, apportionment formulae, and the rate and
rule changes of other states.
We begin our empirical analysis by quantifying the
responsiveness of establishments to local business tax
changes and document the validity of this variation through a
number of robustness checks. If every establishment compares the profits that they would earn across locations (based
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on local taxes, local factor prices, and their local productivity), then counting the number of establishments in a given
area (and measuring how these counts change following tax
changes) will reveal information about the relative importance of taxes, factor prices, and productivities for business
location. We find that a 1 percent cut in local business taxes
increases the number of local establishments by 3–4 percent
over a 10-year period. This estimate is unrelated to other
changes in policy that would otherwise bias our results,
including changes in per-capita government spending and
changes in the corporate tax base such as investment tax
credits. To rule out the possibility that business tax changes
occur in response to abnormal economic conditions, we
analyze the typical dynamics of establishment growth in the
years before and after business tax cuts. We also directly
control for a common measure of changes in local labor
demand from Bartik (1991). Finally, we estimate the effects
of external tax changes of other locations on local establishment growth and find symmetric effects of business tax
changes on establishment growth. These symmetric effects
corroborate the robustness of our reduced-form result of
business tax changes on establishment growth.
To interpret this reduced-form effect and determine its
welfare implications, we develop a local labor markets model
with heterogeneously productive and monopolistically competitive firms. Our model expands recent frameworks in the
local labor markets literature (e.g., Kline and Moretti 2013)
by incorporating modeling features popular in trade models.
Adding these features enables us to model firms’ location and
scale decisions, to incorporate the possibility that individual
firms have location-specific productivities, and to derive a
simple expression that relates these features to local labor
demand. Developing the demand side of local labor markets is
important because our framework allows firm owners to bear
some of the incidence of local economic development policies
and can be used to assess the incidence implications of productivity shocks, as well as many other place-based policies.
Our framework models how business owners, workers,
and landowners benefit from a local corporate tax cut. The
incidence on these three groups depends on the equilibrium
impacts on profits, real wages, and housing costs, respectively. A corporate tax cut affects labor, housing, and product
markets, as well as the location and scale of economic
activity. A tax cut mechanically reduces the tax liability and
the cost of capital of local establishments, attracts establishments, and increases local labor demand. This increase in
labor demand leads firms to offer higher wages, encourages
migration of workers, and increases the cost of housing. Our
model characterizes the new spatial equilibrium following a
business tax cut and relates the changes in wages, rents, and
profits to features of the labor, housing, and product markets.
We show that the incidence on wages depends on the degree
to which establishment location decisions respond to tax
changes, an effective labor supply elasticity that depends
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on housing market conditions, and a macro labor demand
elasticity that depends on location and scale decisions of
establishments. Having determined the incidence on wages,
the incidence on profits is straightforward; it combines the
mechanical effects of lower corporate taxes and the impact of
higher wages on production costs. Our model delivers simple
expressions for the incidence calculations in terms of a few
estimable parameters.
In the third part of the analysis, we estimate these parameters, test overidentifying restrictions of the model, and find
that they are satisfied. In particular, we minimize the distance
between the predicted equilibrium effects of business tax
cuts from our model and the estimated reduced-form effects
of tax cuts on local establishment growth, as well as similar
effects on population, wage, and rental cost growth. The
structural parameters are precisely estimated.
Our main finding is that, over a 10-year period, firm owners bear a substantial portion of the incidence of a corporate
tax change, while land owners and workers split the remaining burden. Our estimates place approximately 40 percent of
the burden on firm owners, 25 percent on landowners, and 35
percent on workers; the finding that firms bear a substantial
portion of the burden is robust across a variety of specifications and estimating assumptions. The result that firm owners
may bear the incidence of local policies starkly contrasts
with existing results in the corporate tax literature (e.g.,
Fullerton and Metcalf 2002) and is a novel result in the local
labor markets literature (e.g., Moretti 2011).
In the last section of the chapter, we analyze the efficiency
costs of state corporate income taxes and discuss the implications of our results for the revenue-maximizing tax rate.
While business location decisions are not particularly sensitive to tax changes, there are important tax interactions with
other revenue sources and apportionment tax rules that affect
revenue-maximizing tax rates. Business mobility is an oftencited justification in proposals to lower states’ corporate tax
rates. However, we find that business location distortions
per se do not lead to a low revenue-maximizing rate. Based
solely on the responsiveness of establishment location to tax
changes, corporate tax revenue–maximizing rates would be
nearly 40 percent. This rate greatly exceeds average state
corporate tax rates, which were 7 percent on average in 2010.
We explore how interactions with other sources of state tax
revenue and apportionment tax rules affect this conclusion.
We find that corporate tax cuts have large fiscal externalities
by distorting the location of individuals. This additional consideration implies substantially lower revenue-maximizing
state corporate tax rates than the 40 percent rate based only
on establishment mobility. Nonetheless, the revenue-maximizing tax rate also depends on state apportionment rules.
We find that states can increase corporate tax rates if these
increases are accompanied by other changes to states’ tax
rules. In particular, by apportioning on the basis of sales
activity, policymakers can decrease the importance of firms’
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location decisions in the determination of their tax liabilities
and thus lower the distortionary effects of corporate taxes.

Chapter 2
Tax Cuts For Whom? Heterogeneous
Effects of Income Tax Changes on Growth
and Employment
Changes to income tax policy in the United States have
varied substantially in the postwar period. In the early 1980s
and 2000s, the largest tax cuts as a share of income went to
top-income taxpayers. In the early 1990s, top-income earners
faced tax increases, while taxpayers with low to moderate
incomes received tax cuts. This chapter investigates how
the composition of these tax changes affects subsequent
macroeconomic activity. Do tax cuts that go to high-income
taxpayers generate more output and employment growth
than similarly sized tax cuts for low- and moderate-income
taxpayers?
Answering this question requires overcoming three empirical difficulties: endogeneity, simultaneity, and observability. First, many tax changes happen in response to current
or expected economic conditions. Second, tax changes for
low- and high-income taxpayers often occur at the same
time. Third, the number of data points and tax changes in the
postwar period is somewhat limited.
I use two identification approaches to overcome these
empirical difficulties: narrative and compositional. For the
narrative approach, I examine the effects of tax changes that
are not related to the current state of the economy according
to the classification approach of Romer and Romer (2010).
They use the historical record (such as congressional records,
economic reports, and presidential speeches) to identify tax
changes that were taken for more exogenous reasons, such
as pursing long-run growth or deficit reduction. Doing so
enables me to overcome the first empirical difficulty. I supplement the narrative strategy with an approach that exploits
compositional differences in income groups across states.
This compositional approach is based on the logic of Bartik
instruments, which are commonly used in the labor literature (Bartik 1991; Katz and Murphy 1992; Moretti 2004).
Bartik’s idea is that a given national shock can have different
impacts at the local level. For instance, a national demand
shock to the auto industry will impact Detroit more than
Denver, since employment in the auto industry comprises
a larger share of local employment in Detroit. Applying
this idea to the question of this chapter, observe that when
national tax policy affects top-income taxpayers, states with
a larger share of top-income taxpayers face bigger aggregate
tax changes. Connecticut, whose share of top-income taxpayers is nearly twice as big as the typical state, is analogous
to Detroit in the auto industry example. In short, my compositional approach compares growth in employment and out9

put across states that face tax shocks of different sizes. Since
these state tax shocks occur in the same year for the same
national policy change, they provide additional identifying
variation and help address simultaneity and observability
issues.
I primarily use individual tax return data to implement
these two identification approaches. For each tax change
that classifies as exogenous, I construct a measure of who
received (or paid for) the tax change. The measure of the
tax change is based on three things: 1) income and deductions in the year prior to an exogenous tax change, 2) the
old tax schedule, and 3) the new tax schedule. For example,
consider a taxpayer in 1992 whose income was $180,000.
Based on her 1992 income and deductions, she would have
paid $50,500 in taxes according to the old 1992 tax rate
schedule and $54,000 according to the new 1993 tax rate
schedule. My measure assigns her a $3,500 tax increase
for 1993. I use the prior year tax data to avoid conflating
behavioral responses and measured changes in tax liabilities.
After calculating mechanical tax changes for each individual taxpayer, I then aggregate these tax changes for each
taxpayer in the bottom 90 percent and top 10 percent of AGI,
respectively.
For the narrative approach, I relate tax changes for the
bottom 90 percent and the top 10 percent to national output,
employment, consumption, and investment growth. For the
compositional approach, I look at similar relationships at the
state level. In particular, I relate state employment growth to
tax shocks for the bottom 90 percent and the top 10 percent,
respectively. Looking at the impact of state tax shocks is
motivated by the following testable insight. If tax cuts for
high-income earners generate substantial economic activity, then states with a large share of high-income taxpayers
should grow faster following a tax cut for high-income
earners.
I find that the stimulative effect of tax cuts largely results
from tax cuts for the bottom 90 percent. A 1 percent of
GDP tax cut for the bottom 90 percent results in roughly 3
percentage points of GDP growth over a two-year period.
The corresponding estimate for the top 10 percent is −0.5
percentage points and is statistically insignificant. Aggregate
consumption growth is stronger following tax changes for
the bottom 90 percent. Consistent with results from individual survey data about how people spend tax rebates (Parker
et al. 2013), durable consumption growth is especially strong
following tax changes for the bottom 90 percent. These
consumption results suggest that tax cuts for the bottom 90
percent stimulate economic activity and result in employment growth. The consumption channel can help explain
why there is little detectable relationship between tax cuts for
the top 10 percent and employment growth in the short run.
Investment also increases following tax cuts for the bottom
90 percent, echoing a classic paradox of thrift result (i.e., a
reduction in individual saving can lead to larger aggregate
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savings by increasing economic growth). The state-level
results, which are based on a different source of identifying
variation, are consistent with these national results. States
with a higher share of high-income taxpayers do not grow
materially faster following high-income tax cuts, while more
low- and moderate-income taxpayers grow much faster following their respective tax cuts. I also estimate the effects of
tax changes across the income distribution to show that these
findings are robust to different income groupings besides
the bottom 90 and top 10, and that the largest impacts come
from the lower-income groups. Overall, my results suggest
that there are substantial effects from fiscal policy, and that
heterogeneity is quite important.
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